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IT INNOVATION WITHIN THE ESPRIT AND IST PROGRAMS 
SOME EVIDENCE FROM THE UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT : 
 
 
The European Strategic Program for Research in Information Technologies (Esprit) was created back in 1983 as a 
defensive response to the US and Japanese lead in Information Technologies (IT). Esprit was driven by the belief 
that intra-EU collaboration is an effective means to enhance the competitiveness of the European IT industry. Esprit 
has undergone a number of changes to facilitate collaboration and innovation. Yet, only after eighteen years of Esprit 
did the European Commission appreciate the need to encourage worldwide co-operation within its Fifth Framework 
Information Society Technologies (IST) Program. In the emerging information society and economy it is conceded 
that new ideas are as likely to be found outside Europe as within. This paper aims to investigate the personal 
networks of UK main contractors in Esprit and IST programs with regard to national boundaries and external 
linkages. It argues that the world of IT innovation is borderless and that Commission policies to impose boundaries 
to collaboration are unlikely to contribute to successful innovation in the IT industry throughout Europe.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Established in 1983, Esprit (the European Strategic Program for Research in Information 
Technologies) is the oldest of the European Commission’s research and technology development 
(RTD) programs. It is also the largest and has been a model for all the Commission’s other RTD 
programs. Esprit arose from the fear that Europe was lagging far behind the US and Japan in vital 
Information Technologies (IT) (Assimakopoulos et al., 2000a; Georghiou, 1999; Mytelka and 
Delapierre, 1987). Collaboration, rather than competition, among Europe’s IT companies, it was 
imagined would yield synergies, the flexibility to adapt in volatile markets, and the shorter 
product cycles essential to international competitiveness (Assimakopoulos and Macdonald, 
1999). The complementary notion of pre-competitive research allowed the Commission to 
subsidize RTD while avoiding the accusation of interfering in the market (Quintas and Guy, 
1995). The collaboration of Esprit has attracted considerable academic attention (e.g., Hagedoorn 
and Schakenraad, 1993; Hagedoorn et al., 2000); whatever Esprit’s success in encouraging 
innovation, it has become a classic in innovation policy.  
 
Esprit in the 1980s was very much the child of the large firms of the European IT industry, the 
Big Twelve. Some would argue that Esprit was still fulfilling their requirements in the late 1990s, 
when a much broader range of stakeholders was involved in building the emerging information 
and knowledge societies. Over the years, the Commission has attempted to transform Esprit by 
encouraging the participation of firms from Europe’s less developed regions, of small and 
medium size firms from across the EU, and lately of stakeholders from throughout the IT supply 
chain, including users from a broad range of institutional settings. Even so, Esprit stands accused 
of retaining its technology-driven approach to IT, not necessarily because this produces more 
innovation and greater competitiveness, but because of the political advantages offered by the 
doctrine of collaboration (Piekkari et al., 2001).  
 
The dual purpose of this paper is to analyze the geography of personal networks of Esprit main 
contractors based in the UK according to national boundaries, and also explore the significance of 
their external linkages for IT innovation. The empirical data is based on 10 Esprit projects, 
examined as case studies. Particular attention is given to the informal networks that link members 
 3
  
of Esprit projects to the most dynamic parts of the IT world in the US and beyond. How do these 
function in the midst of collaboration and the formal networks it imposes (Osborn and 
Hagedoorn, 1997)? Formal networks are defined as those bound by a formal contract between the 
Commission and project partners. In contrast, informal networks include many unacknowledged 
partners acquired through inter-personal links that transcend formal agreements (Johannisson, 
1998). As in other fast developing sectors, informal relationships in the IT industry seem to bring 
the tacit information and embedded knowledge that is conducive to innovation (Assimakopoulos 
and Macdonald, 2002; Boisot, 1998; Badaracco, 1991).  
 
The rest of the paper is in four sections. In Section 2, a brief history of Esprit and IST is provided, 
examining the changes that have taken place within these Programs to encourage collaboration 
and innovation in the European IT industry. Section 3 describes the research methodology, and 
section 4 presents the main findings, based on the ten Esprit projects. Finally, Section 5 draws 
some conclusions.  
 
1. Esprit and IST 
In the early 1980s, European firms had begun to realize that their technology was lagging in such 
core high technology areas as IT and some had already begun to collaborate (Mytelka and 
Delapierre, 1987). Policy makers were becoming increasingly concerned about the gradual loss 
of competitiveness they perceived in the European economy and in the European IT industry in 
particular. The globalization of high technology industries (Narula, 1999), and the wide 
disparities between industrial and technological capabilities of the various country members 
revealed by the continuing expansion of the EU (especially evident in the divide between the 
wealthy countries of the European North and the poor countries of the European South) further 
reinforced this perception (Hagedoorn et al., 2000). Moreover, policy makers on both sides of the 
Atlantic had become very enthusiastic about ‘Japanese-style’ collaborative research and the 
perceived success of ‘keiretsu’ (Georghiou, 1999; Ray, 1998).  
 
European industry generally was beginning to show much more interest in collaborating in R&D, 
previously an activity conducted secretly and independent of competitors’ R&D (Narula and 
Hagedoorn, 1999). According to Narula (1999), the underlying objective of the Framework 
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Programs of the European Commission was not to encourage collaboration per se. Rather, it was 
to encourage collaboration in the run-up to the single European market in 1992. Collaboration 
would allow EU industry to restructure and be better able to face the competitive environment of 
the single market. It was hardly surprising, then, that collaborative R&D became central to 
Commission policy in the early 1980s (Peterson, 1991), and thus that collaboration became 
central to Esprit. In 1981, the Commission suggested that the Big Twelve take a concerted 
approach to IT, and invited their collaboration in drawing up a common strategy (Mytelka and 
Delapierre, 1987). Following the launch of a small pilot program in 1983, Esprit proper was 
started in 1984. There have now been four phases of Esprit research (Esprit I: 1984-87, Esprit II: 
1987-90, Esprit III: 1990-94, and Esprit IV: 1994-98), all jointly funded by the Commission and 
the participating organizations. The Fifth Framework Program (1998-2002) initiated the 
Information Society Technology (IST) Program, placing all European Commission information 
and communication technologies RTD, including Esprit, Acts and Telematics, under one 
umbrella program.  
 
The early Esprit was very much driven by the belief that collaboration among industry, 
universities and public research institutes across Europe was an effective means of narrowing 
what was perceived as a technological gap between European companies and their American and 
Japanese competitors (Hagedoorn et al., 2000 ; Mytelka and Delapierre, 1987 ; Narula, 1999). As 
Mytelka and Delapierre (1987, 233) point out, collaboration among European firms was more 
attractive than alliances with non-European firms because it was thought to involve less risk and 
to enable firms to take advantage of economies of scale in one or more of their production 
processes while remaining separate entities.  
 
Over the 1990s, Esprit went through vast changes in its organization and scope (Assimakopoulos 
et al., 2000b). The European Commission responded to new trends in the collaborative behavior 
of the IT industry by, for example, expanding Esprit participation, encouraged collaboration 
throughout the IT value chain, and increased  emphasis on the users of IT. Some of these 
developments are summarized in Table 1. Despite these alterations in emphasis, many of the 
characteristics of the early Esprit were evident until the conclusion of the Program in 1999. For 
example, Esprit always insisted that the research it supported be collaborative in nature, 
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specifically that there had to be a minimum collaboration in each project of two partner 
organizations from two EU member countries.  
 
Table 1 : Summary of Changes in Esprit and IST from the early 1980s to the early 2000s 
 
Dimension 
 
Esprit (1983-1998) IST (1998-2002) 
Participants in collaboration Dominance of electronic firms, 
IT suppliers, and participants 
from northern Europe as well as 
less favored regions 
A heterogeneous group of 
organizations representing the 
entire IT value chain and 
including SMEs and user 
organizations 
Nature of collaboration Pre-competitive Collaboration in competition 
Focus of collaboration Hard science Soft science (emphasis on socio-
economic research) 
Organization of collaboration Research project Research clusters and networks 
Role in the broader community Inward oriented, isolated Outward oriented, integrated 
 
The early Esprit was also determinedly pre-competitive, focusing on research that was considered 
to be distant from the individual market interests of collaborators. The notion of pre-competitive 
research provided a convenient label for the activity undertaken within collaboration, one 
acceptable to the free market ideology of most European governments of the period (Georghiou, 
1999). It was argued that collaboration in pre-competitive research did not constitute government 
interference with market forces (Quintas and Guy, 1995), and fitted comfortably within a 
technology-push model of innovation. However, sweeping changes in the IT industry, together 
with improved understanding of how innovation is generated, have encouraged Esprit to change 
its emphasis from technology-push to market-pull. This has required abandoning the idea that 
partners can collaborate only when they are being pre-competitive. It has been accepted that they 
may also collaborate when they are cooperating in competition. Indeed, the success of the IST 
Program was dependent on the willingness and ability of partners to collaborate in competitive 
circumstances. 
 
The early Esprit was dominated by the rigid conviction that innovation emanated, quite 
obviously, from science and engineering. Just as the model of innovation within Esprit has 
changed from technology-push to market-pull, Esprit research is no longer confined to science 
and engineering and now includes at least some social science research. The IST Program 
acknowledged that socio-economic research cannot be isolated to a single domain, but must 
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underpin all its IT research. In consequence, the IST Program cannot be accused of fostering 
innovation intended to benefit only the suppliers of IT equipment: IST innovation is now directed 
towards all users of IT. It has been accepted that European competitiveness in IT depends not so 
much on increasing IT research capital as on increasing social capital. There is now no part of the 
economy which is not heavily dependent on IT. 
 
The research consortium - termed the ‘project’ by the Commission - has long been the primary 
unit of Esprit organization. The project has often seemed to be the only unit. All Commission 
organization was centered on the project, as was most monitoring and evaluation. In 18 years 
(1983-2000), some 2,250 Esprit projects have been completed and more than EUR 5.5 billion has 
been spent (Assimakopoulos and Macdonald, 1999). The project officer – the key Commission 
official – tended to regard projects as self-contained, to be completed within a specific timeframe 
as specified by a formal contractual agreement.  
 
The changes that Esprit has undergone in IST with respect to participation, focus, organization 
and orientation were responses to particular trends and developments in the IT sector, and more 
general shifts in the competitive environment. Throughout the history of Esprit and IST, the main 
objective of the Commission has been to create and sustain a fertile platform for collaboration 
and innovation in research and technological development in IT. However, it is difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to confine collaboration and to harness innovation by restricting them to a single 
geographical region, even one with all the resources of Europe. More important, it may be 
pointless as it will be discussed below. 
 
2. Research Methodology 
The sample for this research involved all 67 Esprit projects with UK main contractors included in 
the Prosoma showcase (www.prosoma.lu) between June 1997 and September 1999.  
Administrative leaders of these 67 projects were contacted by post or/and e-mail between 
November 1997 and June 1999, and asked to identify the individual they considered to be the 
technological leader of their project in the UK. The findings presented here are based on network 
data collected from ten of these Esprit projects. A formal network for each UK main contractor 
was identified from the Prosoma and Cordis (www.cordis.lu) databases of the Commission. 
 7
  
Subsequently, personal informal networks were mapped following a multi-step approach. 
Individuals identified as technological leaders within the participating main contractors were sent 
postal questionnaires and each was asked to nominate up to seven other individuals who had 
provided information of significant value for innovation related to the specific Esprit project (see 
Giusti and Georghiou, 1988). In the second round, these nominated individuals were themselves 
contacted and asked the same question. The nomination process continued until resources were 
exhausted and in some cases extended to five rounds. For the majority of the projects, semi-
structured, face-to-face interviews were conducted. It is from these that the quotations used in 
this paper are derived. 
 
The computerised network analysis made use of two software packages for social network 
analysis and visualisation: Ucinet 5 (Borgatti et al., 1999) and Mage 5.4 (Richardson and Presley, 
1999). The former was used to compute a sets of coordinates for the personal network of each 
technological leader, following a common three-step approach. It placed all nominations within a 
binary symmetrical socio-matrix, revealing who was connected with whom within a particular 
project. An assumption was made that all ties were reciprocal in nature since nearly all 
respondents indicated that they supplied information for other innovation of more or less equal 
value. Secondly, it calculated Euclidian distances among the nominated individuals. Euclidian 
distance is a measure of structural equivalence or similarity among the nodes of a network. If, for 
example, two individuals have identical patterns of connections to all others in a network, then 
the Euclidian distance between them is zero (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Thirdly, based on 
Euclidian distances, a set of (x, y, z) coordinates for each individual was calculated using a 3-
dimensional scaling routine (Borgatti et al., 1999). Based on each set of coordinates, Mage 
produced three-dimensional kinetic images for exploring the social structure of each personal 
network. It is pertinent that Mage was initially produced for the visualization of protein 
molecules, but has since been used to visualize and make sense of social structures (Freeman, 
1998). 
 
Furthermore, based on the contact details (i.e. postal address) of nominated individuals across the 
ten projects it was possible to compile a symmetrical valued matrix showing which country is 
connected to which other country. The value of each cell, excluding the cells of the main 
 8
  
diagonal, in this matrix reflected the number of nominating links connecting the two countries. 
The values of the main diagonal showed how many nominations were made within each country. 
Subsequently, Ucinet was used to compute the Euclidian distances among the nominated sixteen 
countries showing the extent of structural similarity among these countries. A set of (x, y, z) 
coordinates for each country was also calculated using a 3-dimensional scaling routine of Ucinet. 
Based on this set of coordinates, Mage produced a three-dimensional kinetic image for exploring 
the structure of this global IT innovation network spanning four continents, namely, Europe, 
North and South America, and Australia. 
 
3. Main Findings 
Table 2 summarizes some of the main findings according to a simple North – South classification 
of countries involved in the study. North includes the following countries: UK, Ireland, France, 
Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Finland, Norway, Sweden, USA and Australia; 
South includes the following countries: Greece, Spain and Brazil. Note that a dyadic link is a 
nomination tie showing that information considered to be of significant value for IT innovation 
was exchanged between two individuals involved in one of the ten projects. 
 
Table 2 : A North – South analysis of links for 10 ESPRIT projects 
 
 
Project 
 
N-N (%) 
 
N-S (%) 
 
Total Number of 
Dyadic Links 
AMULET 10 (100) 0 10 
DELPHI 21 (100) 0  21 
E2S 16 (100) 0 16 
FIRES 8 (47) 9 (53) 17 
FLACSCOM 18 (100) 0  18 
IMPRIMATUR 26 (100) 0 26 
IMPROVE 21 (100) 0 21 
PEPSE 18 (100) 0 18 
PIPER 5 (38) 8 (62) 13 
TIMELY 6 (55) 5 (45) 11 
Total Number of 
Dyadic Links (%) 
 
149 (87) 
 
22 (13) 
 
171 
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As Table 2 shows, the information flows of only three of the ten projects connected people from 
the well developed countries in the North with people in the less developed countries of the 
South. Out of the 171 dyadic links most valued for IT innovation, the vast majority (87 per cent) 
were confined within the information “rich” North of Europe, USA and Australia. Only 13 per 
cent of dyadic links important for IT innovation exchanged or transferred information from the 
North to the South and vice-versa. Since the EU has placed a premium for supporting “less 
favored regions” in its South for four consecutive Framework Programs this is an important 
finding reflecting the discrepancy between the ability to provide financial support through formal 
contracts and the “failure” of policy to re-direct informal information flows from the information 
“rich” in the North to the information “poor” in the South. Furthermore, the nomination of people 
as far apart as Norway, USA and Australia indicates the global nature of IT innovation networks 
as UK main contractors accommodated informal, unacknowledged partners outside the EU with 
the aim of acquiring information valuable for their innovation from far beyond the EU boundary 
(see, also, the more detailed analysis of internal and external linkages below).  
 
Graph 1 shows the global innovation network of UK main contractors based on the ten Esprit 
projects and the sixteen nominated countries. Countries are represented by balls positioned in a 3-
dimensional space according to their structural equivalence in the network. Countries in the 
North are blue and the ones in the South are red. The color of ties also varies according to their 
natures. Ties connecting countries in the North are blue, and ties connecting North countries to 
the South are red. The size of balls also varies according to their degree centrality (Wasserman 
and Faust, 1994, 178) computed by Ucinet (Borgatti et al., 1999). As was expected, the most 
central country in the network is the UK itself. However what it seems surprising is that the 
second most central country in the network is the USA. The UK and USA are respectively 
followed in the third, fourth and fifth places by France, Germany and Belgium. The centrality 
score of USA, a non-EU country that is not allowed to participate as an “equal” partner in EU 
funded projects, begs for questioning further the role of informal partners in Esprit innovation 
networks. Towards this end, they are explored below in some depth the patterns of internal and 
external linkages of the ten projects.  
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Graph 1: A country-based analysis of links for 10 Esprit projects 
 
 
A Austria D Germany I Italy N Norway 
AU Australia E Spain IRL Ireland NL Netherlands 
B Belgium F France GR Greece USA  
BR Brazil FI Finland   UK  
 
 
Table 3 summarizes the main findings with regard to internal linkages (dyadic ties within the EU 
boundary) and external linkages for the ten Esprit projects. Note that most external linkages were 
dyadic ties connecting individuals between an EU and non-EU country, while in some cases both 
individuals worked for organizations outside the EU.  
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Table 3 : Internal vs. External Links for 10 ESPRIT projects 
 
 
 
Project 
 
Internal Links 
Number (%) 
 
External Links 
Number (%) 
 
Total Number of 
Dyadic Links 
AMULET 10 (100) 0 10 
DELPHI 15 (71) 6 (29) 21 
E2S 3 (19) 13 (81) 16 
FIRES 9 (53) 8 (47) 17 
FLACSCOM 3 (17) 15 (83) 18 
IMPRIMATUR 19 (73) 7 (27) 26 
IMPROVE 21 (100) 0 21 
PEPSE 17 (94) 1 (6) 18 
PIPER 13 (100) 0 13 
TIMELY 9 (82) 2 (18) 11 
Total Number of 
Dyadic Links (%) 
 
119 (70) 
 
52 (30) 
 
171 
 
 
As Table 3 shows, the information flows of only three of the ten projects were confined to the 
EU. Out of the 171 dyadic ties, almost a third (31 per cent) transcended the EU boundary. This is 
an important finding, given that none of the 10 projects had any formal partners outside the EU. 
If there was no contractual need to involve outsiders, it seems that the only plausible explanation 
for these external links is that individuals in the majority of projects believed that external, 
informal contacts were particularly useful for innovation (Aldrich and von Glinow, 1992). It 
would seem that the majority of Esprit projects with UK main contractors accommodated 
informal, unacknowledged partners outside the EU with the aim of acquiring information 
valuable for their innovation.  
 
As might have been expected, the majority (57 per cent) of UK main contractors’ external 
linkages were with the USA. EU firms have generally been eager to participate with the US 
companies because of their technological lead in IT (Narula, 1999). The cultural and linguistic 
connections of individual in UK firms would also explain US dominance of their external 
linkages. Also striking is the global spread of external linkages: through these individuals, UK 
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main contractors maintained important links with such countries as Australia, Brazil and Norway. 
As it has long been known that UK organizations participating in the Commission’s RTD 
programs have more collaborative links than their partners (Georghiou et al., 1992), it is perhaps 
worth speculating that the attraction of a UK partner may lie less in its intrinsic qualities than in 
its links with the USA. 
 
Two case studies have been selected to examine in more detail the role of external linkages: 
Imprimatur and E2S. Some 27 per cent of linkages in the Imprimatur project were outside the 
EU, and some 81 per cent in the E2S project. Semi-structured interviews with individuals from 
these projects indicate that external linkages play a critical role in innovation. They transcended 
local social circles and brought in valuable information from well beyond the project. 
 
IMPRIMATUR (Intellectual Multimedia Property Rights Model and Terminology for 
Universal Reference) 
Imprimatur was an Esprit IV project. It aimed to build consensus on electronic copyright 
management and intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the late 1990s. The UK main 
contractor was the Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society (ALCS, www.alcs.co.uk), based in 
London.  
 
 “The Imprimatur consortium is trying to build consensus around digital rights 
trading. That sounds very easy. It isn’t. At the moment, most content is sold in books, 
CD ROMs, videos and so forth. When this content migrates onto networks, the 
question is how can you trade it securely and fairly between the creator, the producer, 
the distributor and the consumer.” 
 
Because the Internet and web disregard national boundaries, problems are caused by differences 
in cultures, legal systems, and so on. To achieve consensus in such infrastructural issues, a large 
number of stakeholders must be consulted. Electronic commerce and digital rights are just such 
an issue. 
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Graph 2 shows the personal network of the Imprimatur main contractor. The balls represent 
individuals and the ties represent nomination network data. The size of balls varies according to 
degree centrality (Wasserman and Faust, 1994), and the colour of ties varies according to their 
natures (internal or external). Internal ties are blue and external ties are pink. As was expected, 
the most central individual in the network is the UK main contractor himself (the largest ball at 
the upper right hand side of the Graph. However, what is even more interesting is that a part of 
his personal network is outside the Esprit formal agreement.  
 
Graph 2 : IMPRIMATUR : Internal – blue and External – red Linkages 
 
The network includes sources of information essential to the Esprit project in the US (e.g., Digital 
Copyright Forum, and the Copyright Clearance Center) and in Australia. The network also 
includes sources in Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. It is notable how nominated 
sources outside the Esprit project themselves nominate sources of information within the project 
so that networks which might have been thought to have been internal to Esprit are in fact 
intertwined with external information networks. The extent of overlap can be seen in the case of 
an American contact (bottom right hand side of the Graph) from the Copyright Clearance Center 
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who is linked with the UK main contractor, but also with two other nominations of the latter: a 
professor at a Dutch university and an ALCS manager. Such overlaps allow valuable information 
for Esprit innovation to flow back and forth from the UK to the USA via a number of direct and 
indirect routes within and outside the ALCS. 
 
It seems that mutual interest and trust hold these information networks together. Neither is easy 
to establish and both take time and effort. A concern encountered frequently among those 
interviewed was that the European Commission was insufficiently sensitive to these 
arrangements and to the personal investment that had gone into making them. In forcing on those 
working on Esprit projects contacts outside their own personal networks, the Commission put at 
risk their personal information networks. Consequently, the Commission endangered the very 
innovation it was trying to encourage. The concern expressed by the technological leader of the 
Imprimatur main contractor in the UK is typical. 
 
 “My network of contacts spans the world, reflecting the global nature of IPR 
[intellectual property rights]. It also spans private companies, NGOs, INGOs, supra-
governmental organizations like the UN and OECD and governments themselves. 
One extremely irksome thing the Commission often tries to force on those who work 
in Esprit is the collaboration with people outside this network of contacts. Such 
people are outside my network of contacts for both personal and professional reasons. 
Therefore when the EC insists one works outside one’s network, such a collaboration 
is bound to fail because it is not based on mutual interest or trust.” 
 
Not surprisingly, there is some tension between project officers in the Commission and 
participants in Esprit projects. Individuals interviewed insisted that their information networks 
are deliberate constructs which can easily be damaged by the clumsy efforts of the Commission 
to create its own dedicated networks. 
 
 “…before you marry somebody you have a period of engagement, you meet, you go to 
parties together. In a sense, Esprit has sometimes felt like it was trying to force people 
into marriages before they actually got to know each other.” 
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E2S (Secure Internet Commerce) 
E2S was also an Esprit IV project. It sought to develop enabling technologies for secure business 
to business transactions over the Internet. According to Prosoma, E2S technology is a major step 
towards ensuring the security of confidential information and commercial transactions over the 
Internet. The E2S architecture is based on secure electronic transaction (SET) technologies for 
bankcard payment systems. SET is an open standard developed jointly by Mastercard, Visa and 
their technology partners to enable card transactions to be made securely over open computer 
networks using encryption technology. Now available in Europe, SET is enabling European 
banks to take a leading role in the international development of secured electronic commerce for 
consumers. The UK main contractor was ANSA Architecture Projects Management in 
Cambridge. Other key partners in the project were Hewlett Packard (HP) research laboratories 
located in Bristol in the UK, and in Grenoble and the Cote d’Azur in France. Graph 3 reveals that 
more than four fifths of the personal network of the main contractor’s technological leader lies 
outside the EU boundary.  
 
Graph 3 : E2S: Internal – blue, and External – red Linkages 
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Only three internal linkages - to the HP laboratory in Bristol, VISA headquarters in Paris, and the 
Technical University of Darmstadt in Germany – are within. There are no internal linkages in 
Graph 3 from the other project partners. For example, contacts at HP laboratories in Grenoble and 
in the Cote d’Azur did not regard those within the project as important sources of technological 
information about the project. The most valued sources are in the East and West Coast of the 
USA. Note that the biggest ball in the network (bottom right hand corner of Graph 3) is the vice-
chairman for electronic commerce in an American bank situated in downtown San Francisco. The 
second most central individual (upper right hand corner of Graph 3) is an engineer at Bell 
Laboratories in New Jersey. It is also interesting that there is a contact at the Citibank Group in 
New York (right hand side, in the middle of Graph 3) who is common to both the source in the 
Bank of America and that at Bell Laboratories. It would seem from the structure of this network 
that UK main contractors benefit most from personal contacts with individuals in the most 
dynamic parts of the IT world and these are outside the EU.  
 
4. Concluding Thoughts 
Esprit was the first, the largest and the longest of the European Commission’s research 
programmes. Understandably, it became a model for other research programmes, but it was also a 
child of its time. The early ‘eighties expected and required government involvement in high 
technology, in which IT was fundamental. Europe expected to be internationally competitive in 
IT, both in the industry itself and in other industries through the use of IT. Government 
involvement took the form of supporting if not national champions then European champions, 
firms reckoned to be large and strong enough to take on the best and biggest in the world. In the 
Esprit case, government involvement also took the form of supporting pre-competitive research 
carried out in collaborative, technology-driven projects which, because of the way they were 
formulated, monitored and assessed, tended to focus on what the Big Twelve, the equipment 
suppliers, wanted to do anyway.  
 
Innovation and technology policy has moved on in the last two decades. The IST Program, which 
replaced Esprit in the Fifth Framework, was very much market-driven and user-driven. Market-
pull has replaced technology-push and the contrived notion of pre-competitive research, which 
did not survive to see the end of Esprit any more than did the dominance of hardware over 
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software. And yet, the Commission’s insistence on collaboration is as strong as ever in the 
forthcoming Sixth Framework (2002-2006) program. It is true that collaboration in IST can still 
be justified in the terms in which it has been justified in Esprit over the last two decades. It is also 
true that collaboration among firms is hardly going out of fashion, though it commonly takes the 
form of mergers, joint ventures and acquisitions these days. But European firms would rather 
collaborate with firms outside Europe, especially firms in the USA, than with those in Europe, 
and they certainly have no desire to restrict their collaboration to technological innovation. It is 
surely sobering that an indication of the success of Esprit is that “prior to ESPRIT European 
firms sought out American companies for technological partnerships. Because of Esprit European 
companies now seek out European partners” (in Peterson and Sharp, 1998, p.73). 
 
But collaboration did not endure in Esprit and has not been retained in IST for the advantages 
claimed for it in the early ‘eighties, nor because it is still fashionable. No, the Commission has 
retained collaboration in IT research for other reasons altogether, basically so that SMEs, firms 
from the “less favored regions” in the South of Europe, and now the users of IT, can be included 
in projects.  
 
"The reasons the Commission have to impose some partners is that they will be left 
out if they don't, and they put money into the pot in Europe, and occasionally they are 
saying why don't you pick up this company in trouble... Yeah, all right we will have 
them in the project... It is a pain but we did it because it helps.... The EC is full of 
politics. Full of it, and we try and avoid that, and try and focus rather hard on what we 
try to do."  
 
Mere inclusion does not guarantee that new participants actually do participate in projects, that 
they contribute or benefit at all: the reality of collaboration can mean the same old groupings and 
little new blood. Though the Commission justified its requirement for collaboration among 
participants in its RTD programs in terms of the advantages for innovation, collaboration also 
satisfied the Commission’s own political requirements. Collaboration may bring political benefits 
for the Commission, but not necessarily benefits in terms of IT innovation. Much Esprit 
collaboration was nominal in that it was arranged to satisfy application requirements, to improve 
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prospects of funding, or to please project officers with the consequence that some partners made 
little or no contribution to innovation. Such collaboration could hardly have improved the 
prospects of innovation. It may even have imposed a cost on innovation for which the benefits 
brought through informal networks extending beyond the formal collaboration were some 
compensation. 
 
This study indicates that much of the information for innovation in Esprit did come from external 
sources – external to Esprit projects and often external to Europe. Very often it was acquired by 
personal and informal means. It would seem that the formality of collaboration in Esprit managed 
to accommodate this informal networking, not because the Commission was sensitive to the 
importance of these networks and anxious not to disrupt their operation, but because their 
members were absolutely determined that the Commission would not interfere with their 
networks. 
 
Non-European firms may now participate in European Commission programs, but as non-funded 
and therefore unequal partners. This is some concession to reality, but still inadequate recognition 
of the non-European contribution to EC programs in IT. The Commission still requires European 
firms to collaborate so that they may be more efficient in IT research, more innovative, and thus 
more competitive, especially against the Americans and Japanese. Such a notion is really no 
longer appropriate in the modern IT industry, an industry whose product, structure, ownership, 
research, innovation and market are utterly global. It is positively surreal in a research program 
like IST, which specifically seeks to exploit networks and clustering, and in the very IT 
technology which facilitates information networking, both formal and informal. The consequence 
of the Commission’s continued insistence on European collaboration may well be reduced IT 
activity in Europe, and this is far too great a price to pay for the political convenience of the 
European Commission. 
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